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System Impact In Gerstein v. Pugh
WILLIAM A. McKINSTRY*
Tinkering by federal courts with a particular step in state crimi-
nal procedure may cause a substantial impact on the whole of the
state criminal justice system. In theory, a federal court must con-
sider both the accused's interest in revising the procedure he is
subject to and the state's interest in maintaining its institutions. In
practice, all too often, a court's intense focus on the accused's inter-
est at one stage in the criminal proceeding has blinded it to the
governmental interest in the entire criminal justice system. The
United States Supreme Court in the October 1974 term confronted
a case wherein the lower court, in complete disregard for the
government's concerns, had ordered that the accused be given pro-
cedural relief previously not provided by state law.2
The court of appeals' decision in Pugh v. Rainwater' generated
speculation that the preliminary hearing, with the panoply of rights
found in adversary proceedings, would be imposed upon the crimi-
nal justice system of those states which did not otherwise require it.'
* Deputy District Attorney, Alameda County, California; Certified Specialist in Criminal
Law; J.D., 1968, University of California, Hastings College of Law; B.S., 1963, St. Mary's
College of California.
1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 297 U.S. 254 (1970).
2. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F.Supp. 1286 (S.D.Fla.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 483 F.2d
778 (5th Cir. 1973).
3. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973)
4. See, e.g., Comment, 25 VAND. L. REV. 434, 445 (1972), where the author predicted:
The preliminary hearing is likely to become more and more important, even to the
point at which it will be recognized as an absolute right of all criminal defendants,
regardless of how they are arrested, charged, or proceeded against. The instant case
[Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.Fla.1971)] is an important step in that
direction.
In Comment, 60 VA. L. REV. 540, 550 (1974), the author concluded that the "Rainwater
court's emphasis of the preliminary hearing's role is a significant step in the direction of fairer
treatment of those accused of crime."
It was predicted in Griffin, The Preliminary Hearing vs. the Grand Jury Indictment:
"Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal Jurisprudence" Revisited, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 825, 842 (1974):
[Tihe United States Supreme Court will uphold the decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Pugh v. Rainwater [483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973)] and require
that any citizen charged by information with a crime be afforded a prompt judicial
review of the charges against him. Such a holding will affect the criminal procedure
of many states by reducing the procedural framework to the simple requirement
that every accused be given either a prompt preliminary hearing or grand jury
indictment."
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The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and merely ordered a non-
adversary probable cause determination. The prediction of the com-
mentators regarding the outcome of Pugh failed in part because
they neglected to consider, as did the lower federal court, the impact
of a preliminary hearing requirement on the criminal justice system.
The Supreme Court fashioned relief which accommodates both the
interest of the detainee and the interest of the responsible criminal
justice system. This, then, is the topic of this article: how the con-
cern for the impact a preliminary hearing would have on the
criminal justice system contributed to the Supreme Court's decision
in Gerstein v. Pugh.'
The impact of the imposition of preliminary hearing procedures
on those criminal justice systems, which do not otherwise provide
for it, is measured in the elementary level, in terms of the cost of
accommodation; however, in the past the governmental interest in
saving costs has been recognized, but accorded little weight.6 But
there are other aspects to that portion of the formula termed govern-
mental interest. Since a court reviewing a state criminal procedure
for due process purposes "must take into consideration the entire
course of proceeding in the courts of the state,"' factors in addition
to cost analysis must be weighed. Other factors include projected
change in the caseload to be carried by the system; expansion or
attention of personal and physical facilities an attendant delays in
executing such changes; maintenance or modification of the func-
tions performed by various agencies within the system; and any
change in the basic nature of criminal law practice in the particular
system.
This article, after a preliminary review of the history of Gerstein
v. Pugh, discusses that decision in terms of its impact on the crim-
inal justice system, isolates the Court's response to pertinent argu-
See also Note, A Constitutional Right To Preliminary Hearings For all Pretrial Detainees,
48 S. CAL. L. REv. 158, 183, where the author, after disposing of the major objection to
requiring preliminary hearings prior to binding an accused over for trial-the incremental
expenditure occasioned thereby-concludes:
In the context of pretrial detention, a reasonably reliable method of truth ascertain-
ment requires that probable cause to hold for trial be determined by a neutral
decisionmaker and that the accused have the right to a personal evidentiary hearing
to challenge the existence of probable cause. Since the preliminary hearing is the
only procedure presently utilized which complies with these due process require-
ments, it should be considered a constitutionally required step in all pretrial crimi-
nal proceedings which subject the accused to pretrial detention.
5. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
6. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
7. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915).
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ments, and in conclusion, notes the reaction in some states to the
Court's response.
THE CASE
In March of 1971, plaintiffs were arrested in Florida for felonies
and misdemeanors. They were held in custody pending trial on a
state's attorney's information which was neither preceded nor fol-
lowed by a preliminary hearing before a magistrate. Later that
month, the Public Defender for Dade County, Florida, filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, a
class action suit on behalf of plaintiffs against the state's attorney,
Richard E. Gerstein, and others. Plaintiffs contended that they had
been deprived of their constitutional right to a preliminary hearing
before a judicial officer to determine whether there was probable
cause to believe that they had committed the offenses with which
they were charged.' In May of 1971, the district court took defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment under advisement for the pur-
pose of permitting the Florida legislature to consider legislation in-
troduced by the Dade County Bar Association which would have
granted plaintiffs' relief.' The legislature adjourned without enact-
ing the proposed statute. "When this [deferment to the legislature]
proved fruitless," the court observed "the time of restraint is past
and the Court has no alternative except to act."' 0
The district court initially considered whether the Federal Anti-
Injunction Statute" or the ruling in Younger v. Harris2 prevented
8. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (S.D. Fla. 1971). Count II alleged that
plaintiffs had been denied their constitutionally protected rights to equal protection of the
law in that in certain instances the police would proceed through the offices of the justices of
the peace instead of going to the offices of the state's attorney. The justice of the peace would
conduct a preliminary hearing whereas the state's attorney would not. It was contended that
the unfettered discretion of the police in deciding whether to file through the justice of the
peace or through the state's attorney resulted in arbitrary and unreasonable creation of two
classes of arrested persons, those who were afforded a preliminary hearing and those who were
not. The district court granted relief as to count I, and thus considered it unnecessary to
determine whether the system was invalid for failure to afford equal protection of the law. In
count III, plaintiffs contended that the setting of a monetary bail bond as a condition for
release of persons financially unable to post bond discriminated against poor persons, thereby
violating their right of equal protection of the law. The district court found that, in setting
bond, the severity of the crime, along with the accused's ties to the community, past criminal
record, and financial resources were all considered. There was no allegation that any bond in
excess of that necessary to ensure trial appearance was set. Since plaintiffs' confinement was
not the result of a classification based solely upon wealth, the court concluded that they had
not been deprived of their right to equal protection of the law. Id. at 1115.
9. 332 F.Supp. at 1109.
10. Id.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). This statute provides:
19761
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it from acting in this case. The court reasoned that plaintiffs re-
quested only a declaration of procedural rights and an injunction
from the continued denial of those rights, so that a district court was
empowered to act. The court concluded
that under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, arrested per-
sons, whether or not released on bond, have the constitutional right
to a judicial hearing on the question of probable cause."3
The district court then certified the case as a valid class action and
ordered that plaintiffs "shall immediately be given a preliminary
hearing to determine probable cause for their arrest by a commit-
ting magistrate unless their cases have been otherwise concluded.""
The district court further ordered defendants to submit within 60
days a plan providing for timely preliminary hearings before a judi-
cial officer in all cases where the accused is prosecuted upon direct
information. 5
At this point, the effect intended by the district court upon the
criminal justice system in Dade County, Florida should be noted.
First, the court found that since it was not enjoining a particular
prosecution it was empowered to rule in the matter. Secondly, the
court determined to act after the legislature of the State of Florida
had failed to do so. Thirdly, the district court ordered that the
police, prosecutors and judges of the county's inferior courts provide
accused persons with a timely adversary hearing to determine
whether the prosecution should continue. The degree to which the
federal court decided to restructure the criminal justice system was
well illustrated by the detailed plan it subsequently adopted.
On January 25, 1972, the district court ordered that its modifica-
tion of a plan submitted by defendants be implemented within three
months. The plan provided for a first appearance hearing within
three hours after arrest. At that appearance, the accused was to be
advised by a magistrate of the charges against him, and of his con-
stitutional rights. A preliminary hearing date would then be set
within four days thereof. At the preliminary hearing the accused
would be afforded the right to compel attendance of witnesses
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
12. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). That decision essentially prohibited federal court injunctions of
pending state criminal proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances where the dan-
ger of irreparable injury is great and immediate.
13. 332 F.Supp. at 1115.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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within the state, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against
him, to exclude witnesses during the testimony of other witnessses,
to separate witnesses until all are examined, to present a defense,
and to secure a transcript of the proceedings. Should the prosecu-
tion fail to provide the accused with a timely preliminary hearing,
he would be entitled to have the charges withindrawn. 11
Implementation of this modified "Purdy Plan" was stayed by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the 31st of March, 1972.11 Never-
theless, on April 15, 1972, the Dade County magistrate system was
created by administrative order of the Chief Judge of the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit of Florida. The fifth circuit heard oral argument on
the appeal from the district court on October 18, 1972. Thereafter,
the case was remanded to the district court for specific findings on
the constitutional deficiencies of the Dade County magistrate sys-
tem. Prior to that consideration, however, the procedural format of
the criminal justice system shifted again. On December 6, 1972, the
Florida Supreme Court issued its amended Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, effective as of February 1, 1973.
Based on 16 days of experience under the new rules, the district
court found that these amended rules were defective in four as-
pects."8 First, the new rules did not afford an accused a preliminary
hearing if he was charged on an information filed by the State's
Attorney. The court held that:
This practice cannot be reconciled with the constitutional require-
ments of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
the fourth amendment. The continuation of the practice is in clear
conflict with the plan previously entered by the court and with the
original decision of this court."9
Second, the new rules authorized preliminary hearings only for
those charged with felonies. Although the modified "Purdy Plan"
did not specifically provide for misdemeanors, it was implicit that
all persons charged with crimes, be they misdemeanors or felonies,
were to be accorded preliminary hearings. Since misdemeanants
held in custody suffer the same loss of liberty as felons, the district
court concluded that the "present practice deprives misdemeanants
of equal protection of the law, in addition to due process and fourth
amendment guarantees."20 Third, the rules established time re-
16. Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F.Supp. 490, 493 (S.D.FIa. 1972).
17. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F.Supp. 1286, 1287 (S.D.FIa. 1973).
18. Id. at 1287-88.
19. Id. at 1289.
20. Id. at 1291.
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quirements for preliminary hearings dependent on the severity of
the possible punishment. In capital offenses the preliminary hearing
would be held within 7 days of the first appearance, otherwise, the
preliminary hearing would be held within 72 hours of defendant's
first appearance. The district court indicated that
the present practice of not setting the same time requirement for
all persons who will be proceeded against by information violates
the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 21
Fourth, the amended rules did not provide for sanctions as did the
district court's plan:
The failure to provide sanctions is not, of itself, a constitutional
infirmity. It is the failure to accord probable cause hearings which
offends the Constitution. Thus, the lack of sanctions is invalid only
insofar as the failure to provide sanctions results in a system which
tolerates the denial of, or overruling of, a preliminary hear-
ing. . . .Therefore the court finds that the failure of the present
practice to provide a remedy for the denial of a preliminary hearing
or the overruling of a preliminary hearing by the use of the infor-
mation process, insofar as that failure tolerates and condones such
denials or overrulings, results in a violation of the fourth and four-
teenth amendments. 2
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 3 the district court
regarding the primary issue: whether the fourth and fourteenth
amendments require that a person arrested and held for trial be
afforded a hearing before a judicial officer to determine probable
cause even if an information has been filed against him by a state's
attorney. They found plaintiffs' claim not barred by federal/state
comity, and distinguished actions which sought declaratory or in-
junctive relief interfering with pending or future state prosecutions
from actions which merely presented questions that would affect
state procedures for handling criminal cases. Since the relief sought
by plaintiffs "was not against any state prosecution as such, but
only against the state's practice" no necessity was found to abstain
from considering the matter. 24 The court next addressed the central
issue and affirmed the judgment of the district court "requiring the
State of Florida to immediately give plaintiffs a preliminary hearing
to determine probable cause for their arrests unless their cases have
21. Id. at 1292.
22. Id. at 1293.
23. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
24. Id. at 781-83.
25. Id. at 788.
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been otherwise concluded."25
Directing its attention to the particular conflicts between the
amended rules and the modified "Purdy Plan," the court vacated
that portion of the "Purdy Plan" which set a four-day maximum
period between first appearances and preliminary hearing, in con-
trast to the six-day period provided for in the amended rules, on the
ground that such a finding was unnecessary to the disposition of the
case.2" The court further vacated that portion of the district court's
order which provided for sanctions. However, the court did agree
that since Florida had not shown that it required more time to
handle the mechanics of a preliminary hearing where life or capital
offenses are involved, a time disparity was inconsistent with equal
protection. Likewise violative of equal protection was the exclusion
of the right to a preliminary hearing for misdemeanants 7
Thus, the lower courts resolved the central issue of the case in
favor of plaintiff and ordered a restructuring of the Florida criminal
justice system to provide for adversary preliminary hearings in vir-
tually all criminal cases. The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, disagreed and refrained from granting plaintiff similar relief
and merely required a non-adversary probable cause determina-
tion.2" The lower courts accorded little weight to the impact of their
decision on the state criminal justice system. A review of the argu-
ments made to the Supreme Court by various amici regarding this
aspect of governmental interest will reveal, in part, the reason the
Court selected this less drastic alternative solution.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 788-90.
In September of 1973, the state's attorney petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that a preliminary hearing was not mandated by the fourth or
fourteenth amendments once an information had been filea against a defendant by the state's
attorney. Plaintiffs below filed a cross-petition for certiorari because the court of appeals did
not order a preliminary hearing immediately after arrest. The Supreme Court granted the
state's attorney's petition, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973), but denied that of the plaintiffs, 42 U.S.L.W.
3549-50 (April 2, 1974). Thereafter, upon filing of a brief by petitioner and respondent and
by the Dade County Bar Association and the State of Florida as amicus, the matter was
argued to the Supreme Court of the 25th of March, 1974. 42 U.S.L.W. 3549-50 (April 2, 1974).
The matter was set for re-argument and, on the 28th of May, 1974, the United States was
invited to file an amicus brief as well as all fifty states. Gerstein v. Pugh, 417 U.S. 905 (1974).
The States of Washington, California, Utah, Louisiana and New Jersey, Texas, Georgia,
Massachusetts and Vermont filed briefs of amicus primarily asserting the arguments of peti-
tioner. The National Legal Aid and Defenders Association filed an amicus on behalf of the
respondents. The United States also accepted the invitation to file a brief of amicus. Respon-
dents filed a supplemental brief in response to the amicus briefs for the states and a second
supplemental brief for respondents in response to the brief of amicus of the United States.
The matter was reargued on October 21, 1974, 43 U.S.L.W. 3245-46 (1974), and decided on
February 18, 1975.
28. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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THE ARGUMENT
Through the Gerstein tapestry runs a common thread concerning
the impact of the decision upon the criminal justice system. Weigh-
ing plaintiffs' loss of liberty against the countervailing interests of
the state in avoiding the burden of preliminary hearings, the district
court declared:
Although the state may incur additional expense in expanding its
existing committing system to include hearings for direct Informa-
tion cases, this expense will be more than offset by savings in jail
and trial costs regarding those persons heretofore jailed and/or
tried without probable cause. Moreover, these financial considera-
tions are so grossly overbalanced by the prolonged loss of freedom
by innocent persons that further comment is unnecessary. 9
However, three years later, the Supreme Court, in the same case,
observed:
Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases
and the complexities of our system. The processing of misdemean-
ors, in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are
marked by the delays that can seriously affect the quality of jus-
tice. A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all
persons detained pending trial could exacerbate the problems of
pretrial delay.
3
As the case traversed the federal judiciary many facets of system
impact were argued. First, concern for reduction of the caseload
within the system was manifested. The district court noted that
between January 1, 1970, and March 31, 1971, the state's attorney
declined to file charges in the cases of 1,165 persons arrested for
criminal behavior." The Court concluded:
Obviously, a judicial officer considering probable cause on a pre-
liminary hearing would have promptly disposed of all these cases
with a tremendous saving of human misery (to all those who had
been arrested on insufficient evidence) and of tax dollars (to the
average citizen who is paying for the cost of a vastly overcrowded
jail facility in Dade County, Florida). 2
The court of appeals opined that it did "not lightly dismiss the
29. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F.Supp. 1107, 1114 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
30. 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975).
31. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F.Supp. 1107, 1110 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
32. The court's conclusion was a non sequitur because the court confused probable cause
to detain with probable cause to hold to answer for trial, i.e., a prima facie case, with
sufficiency of the evidence to charge and convict a criminal defendant.
[Vol. 7
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detention of a minimum of 1,165 defendants against whom charges
were subsequently dropped. 3 3 The district court further considered
the caseload aspect of system impact when it dismissed the predic-
tion that
if the five Dade County judges assigned as magistrates were to
provide preliminary hearings for misdemeanants as well as felons
their caseload might increase by as much as 30 to 35,000 cases a
year, or approximately 3,000 a month.3
4
The district court concluded, however,
that the increase in the magistrate's caseload from providing pre-
liminary hearings to misdemeanants who face potential
imprisonment will fall considerably short of [the] projection and,
if substantial, will not be overly burdensome. The court concludes,
moreover, that while more magistrates as well as courtroom facili-
ties may be needed as a result of our order, and that costs may
increase in the short run, it will not be a significant increase.35
The court did derive comfort in its estimate that
as a result of the magistrate system [existing apparently under the
Florida Amended Rules of Criminal Procedure and not the modi-
fied "Purdy Plan"] felony caseloads have been reduced by 20 to
25 percent, with corresponding savings to the taxpayers of Dade
County .3
One is struck by the selective use of statistics by these courts. 7
33. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 783 n.12 (5th Cir. 1973). The subsequent recitation
of these statistics by the Fifth Circuit's is incomprehensible in view of the curious shifting
factual basis of this case. These statistics were generated under the practice that existed
when plaintiffs were arrested in March of 1971. See Gerstein v. Pugh 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
On January 25, 1972, the district court ordered the modified "Purdy plan" to be implemented
by defendants in 90 days. Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490, 493 (S.D. Fla. 1972). How-
ever, on March 31, 1972, the fifth circuit stayed this order. Then on April 15, 1972, Chief
Judge Marshall C. Wisehart of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida independently created
a committing magistrate system by administrative order. On October 24, 1972, the fifth
circuit ordered the district court to make specific findings on the constitutional deficiency of
the "present" practice. But before the Dade County Magistrate System could be reviewed,
the Florida Supreme Court on December 6, 1972, issued its amended rules of criminal proce-
dure. Thereafter, the "parties agreed and stipulated to the premise, in which the court
concurs, that the mandated assessment of present practices must concern itself with the state
procedures after February 1, 1973, under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure as now
amended." Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. at 1288 (emphasis added). Although the system
to be reviewed shifted from that in effect on March of 1971 to the modified "Purdy Plan" to
the Dade County magistrate system, to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect as
of February 1, 1973, the fifth circuit saw fit to cite the 1971 statistics in its review of the
practice as of 1973.
34. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F.Supp. 1286, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See note 33 supra.
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When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Gerstein, the criminal justice system to be affected by this decision
expanded from that prevailing in Dade County, Florida, to systems
of the 50 states and the federal system. The United States as amicus
curiae argued that
in considering misdemeanor cases (four to five million annually in
the state courts, ten thousand, in the federal courts and 6,500 in
the superior courts of the District of Columbia), it is particularly
appropriate to balance the supposed benefit to the accused from a
preliminary hearing against the strain on the criminal justice sys-
tem that will be imposed by diverting overburdened judges, court
personnel, lawyers, and facilities from the task of speedily dispos-
ing of cases to trial."
The district court indicated a ready willingness to drastically
affect the disposition of manpower and facilities in the Dade County
criminal justice system by its modified "Purdy Plan," rejecting sys-
tem impact as a real consideration:
Although we acknowledge that a state has a proper interest in
maintaining its fiscal integrity and may legitimately attempt to
limit its expenditures, it is well settled that a state may not accom-
plish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of
its citizens [felons and misdemeanants]. In the case before us,
defendants must do more than show that denying due process to
misdemeanants will save money. In the absence of other sugges-
tions of compelling interests, we must conclude that present prac-
tice deprives misdemeanants of equal protection of the law, in
addition to due process and fourth amendment guarantees.39
However, the Solicitor General took the opposite tack and observed
that:
Our analysis of the requirements of due process necessarily consid-
ers the cost to the criminal justice system of requiring preliminary
hearings with live witnesses in every case. Such a requirement will
divert already overburdened judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers,
court personnel and court facilities from the task of speedily dis-
posing of cases. Moreover, the very real problem of securing the
cooperation of lay witnesses will be exacerbated by procedures
requiring them to spend additional time waiting to testify and
actually testifying in court; and law enforcement officers called to
38. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975).
39. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F.Supp. 1286, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 7910
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court for such preliminary matters, will be taken away from the
active prevention and investigation of crime. 0
Another facet of the criminal justice system potentially affected
by Gerstein was the function of certain of the participants in the
system. Although the district court apparently did not intend to
infringe upon the charging function of the state's attorney, the tim-
ing requirements and sanctions imposed by the modified "Purdy
Plan" tended to deny the state's attorney free reign to exercise the
prerogatives of his office. The first paragraph of the modified
"Purdy Plan" implied that the election to proceed by information
or indictment would remain with the state's attorney. However, the
requirement that a preliminary hearing be conducted not more than
four days after the first appearance, which occurred within 24 hours
of arrest, sharply circumscribed the time in which the state's attor-
ney had to charge by indictment." The brief of the State of Wash-
ington as amicus curiae called to the Supreme Court's attention this
problem:
The preliminary hearing schedule adopted by the district court
and court of appeals below places tight time restrictions on filing
the information and preparing for the hearing. One effect, we sub-
mit, is to substantially reduce the prosecutor's role in the decision
to charge. He is more likely to file an information on the appear-
ance that the defendant has committed a crime, put on the neces-
sary quantum of evidence to get the magistrate to bind over the
case, and then, at greater leisure and upon fuller investigation,
determine whether he really wants to prosecute. If he does not file
immediately, he may lose the opportunity to do so later if the
putative defendant is no longer available. The effect arguably is
to have persons charged and confined following the hearing who
would otherwise not have been charged. But on the other hand, a
less aggressive prosecutor would have the tendency to act more
conservatively and avoid charging suspects when he does not be-
lieve from the evidence initially available that he will be able
ultimately to get a conviction. 2
Plaintiff's first count prayed for a preliminary hearing to deter-
mine probable cause to detain the plaintiff. Yet the probable cause
hearing designed by the district court went beyond probable cause
to detain to include probable cause to hold to answer for the charge.
40. Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae at 19, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975).
41. Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F.Supp. 490, 491 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
42. Brief for the State of Washington as Anicus Curiae at 20-21, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975).
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The modified "Purdy Plan" provided that if a defendant was not
afforded preliminary hearing within the time period set forth,
then all charges shall be withdrawn and the defendant, if incarcer-
ated, shall immediately be released. The State shall be permitted
to refile a charge so withdrawn, however, in the event the charge
is twice withdrawn pursuant to this provision, the defendant shall
not again be held to answer to that charge except upon an indict-
ment of the Grand Jury returned within thirty (30) days of the date
of the second withdrawal."
Also, if the magistrate at a preliminary hearing discharges the de-
fendant, he
shall not be required to answer to a subsequent charge for the same
offense(s) except upon .an indictment from the Grand Jury which
shall have been returned within thirty (30) days of the defendant's
discharge. 4
Fortunately, these overzealous sanctions imposed by the court
which struck at the charging function of the state's attorney were
eliminated by the court of appeals: "We will not presume that such
onerous sanctions are necessary to insure compliance with the law
of this circuit. '45
The Solicitor General voiced concern for the attack on the charg-
ing function implicit in the decisions below, arguing that the charg-
ing decision is an executive function that is not amenable or subject
to judicial review.
Is the result a release on bail or a dismissal of the charges? If the
result is release on bail, then the bail hearing is adequate for the
purposes of determining probable cause to hold the accused in
custody. On the other hand, if the result is the dismissal of the
charges, then the result is anomalous: What of the persons who
have already been released from bail; do they get the review of
probable cause?"
The government concluded that "if the fifth circuit is upheld then
the whole system of information in the charging responsibility falls
by the wayside."' 7
The responsibility of the prosecutor to charge crimes was not the
only function placed in jeopardy. The decision below tended to shift
43. Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F.Supp. 490, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
44. Id.
45. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 790 (5th Cir. 1973).
46. 43 U.S.L.W. 3245-46 (Oct. 29, 1974).
47. Id. at 3246.
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the pretrial responsibilities from a court of general trial jurisdiction
to one of limited jurisdiction. The State of Florida questioned the
propriety of this shift, distinguishing the functions in the Florida
criminal justice system circuit courts, which are courts of general
jurisdiction, and county courts, lesser tribunals presided over by
officials akin to magistrates whose jurisdiction is limited to misde-
meanors, and concluding that:
By ruling as they did in the decision below, the Court of Appeals
purported to vest the several magistrates (county judges) in Flor-
ida with jurisdiction to review an accused's custody ostensibly on
the theory of a preliminary hearing. The net effect of this is to
permit (by dint of an impossible judicial fiat) Florida's lowest
court to override the authority of a Florida circuit court, even to
the point of ordering the release of an accused theretofore con-
trolled only by the circuit court or by other courts above it men-
tioned previously. The Florida Supreme Court has never vested
magistrates with that kind of authority-they do not now have
it-and they cannot be given it, however desirable that conclusion
may appear to the Court of Appeals below."'
Finally, the decision's impact on the practice of criminal law in
each jurisdiction was debated. New Jersey, Texas and Vermont
each summarized their practice and argued that their procedures
should not be altered.49 Louisiana asked that, should the Supreme
Court affirm the lower court, application of the decree be applied
prospectively only.50 In support of its argument that an adversary
hearing ought not be constitutionally required, Washington pre-
sented the Supreme Court with a realistic view of criminal practice
vis-a-vis preliminary hearings, which apparently made a substan-
tial impression on the Supreme Court." The crux of Washington's
argument was that:
48. Brief for the State of Florida as Amicus Curiae at 16, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975).
49. Brief for the State of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae at 4-10; Brief for the State of Texas
as Amicus Curiae at 3-11; Memorandum of the Attorney General of the State of Vermont as
Amicus Curiae at 1-10, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
50. Original Brief for the State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae at 6-9, Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975).
51. Washington based its argument on a study, F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION
To CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME, which is cited by the Supreme Court in that portion of
the opinion which rejects the constitutional necessity for an adversary hearing. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. at 622.
Substantial portions of the Washington Brief deserve note:
An analysis of the prosecutors' role in filing an information and of the effect and
practice of preliminary hearings justifies a conclusion that there is no absolute
19761
4 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 7
constitutional due process right to a preliminary hearing pursuant to the fourth and
fourteenth amendments . . . The court, however, we believe, misapprehends the
nature of the preliminary hearing and its value to obtain minimum standards of
due process.
The preliminary hearing, perhaps ideally, is employed to protect the defendant
from oppressive and false prosecutions and save both him and the public the ex-
pense and trauma of unnecessary trials . . . The reality, is a hearing more in the
form of an ex parte proceeding with the defendant present.
There are apparently a number of reasons for this, such as the unavailability in
some places of counsel for indigents at the preliminary hearing, the objective of
each party to avoid revealing their case to the other side, and the tendency of
magistrates to give a cursory review of the evidence and rely on the prosecutor to
make the correct charging decision and on the trial court to finally sift the evidence.
In addition, a preliminary hearing can be advantageous to the defense by setting
the prosecution witnesses in their testimony, solidifying the allegiance of the prose-
cutor's witnesses, increasing adverse publicity, and preserving adverse witness tes-
timony. Given the general real nature of preliminary hearings, it is appropriate to
ask whether the preliminary hearing is a sufficiently useful evidence screening
device as to make its availability a matter of constitutional imperative.
The typical approach by the prosecutor to a preliminary hearing . . . is to put
on as little evidence as he feels necessary to get a bind-over decision. Normally, this
is accomplished through the testimony of one or two witnesses, usually the arresting
officer and perhaps some sort of expert testimony. The prosecutor wants to give as
little of his case of the defendant who in turn, even when represented by counsel,
will seldom offer any rebuttal evidence preferring to save his ammunition for the
jury. The result of this policy is that occasionally cases are dismissed or bound over
when they should not be. This does not mean that the evidence available would
actually be insufficient to provide probable cause to charge or that there is an
affirmative defense, but simply that enough has not been offered. In addition, both
deputy presecutors and defense attorneys normally enter preliminary hearings
having had too little time to investigate and prepare for useful adversary probing
of the issues. Part of the reasons defendants make no serious effort to obtain a
dismissal in those cases is the reliance on the thorough screening of the prosecutor
prior to the preliminary examination to eliminate the weak case. If there is consci-
entious case screening by the prosecutor and indeed police officials, there is little
need for further screening by a magistrate. The number of cases dismissed at
preliminary hearings is quite low-probably an average dismissal rate of about two
percent of all persons entitled to a preliminary hearing which would include those
who waive the preliminary hearing. . . . The workload borne by prosecutor's off-
ices, particularly in our urban areas, encourages prosecutors to weed out weak cases
and charge only in instances where probability of conviction is high. There are some
indications the prosecutors are concerned about a good conviction rate. This factor,
to the extent that it plays a part in the decision to prosecute, together with the
desire to avoid conviction of the innocent and mitigate the harshness of the law by
applying a measure of human tolerance to the rigid letter of the law, and the
workload and limited time of manpower resources of prosecutor offices all tend to
encourage early and critical screening of criminal allegations and to encourage the
application of a standard to the charging decision based upon the probability of
ultimate conviction rather than the less demanding standard of probable cause to
believe that the defendant committed the crime.
Magistrates tend to apply one of three standards in deciding whether to bind over
the defendant. They may see their functions solely as to test the sufficiency of the
evidence to go to the jury. . . . Or the judge may see his function as that of
screening out unconvictable people, a standard normally adopted by the prosecu-
tors to govern their own charging decisions. Finally, the magistrate may bind a
defendant over if a prima facie case is indicated but advise dismissal if the defen-
System Impact In Gerstein
In search for due process in a state's criminal procedure, the
[Supreme Court ought tol look beyond the forms to the substance
of process and . . . consider the whole course of the criminal pro-
ceedings and not merely a single step. . . . [T]o require as a
matter of due process preliminary hearings in all cases where pros-
ecution is by information, rather than improve the quality of jus-
tice, would create new frustations and impediments to the timely
adjudication of criminal matters. . . .The difficulty of defining
due process in quantitative terms indicates the elusive quality of
that element of judicial mechanism. Its essence is-best approached
when we have fairly balanced competing interests within the
mechanism. The Court must weigh what is to be gained by requir-
ing a preliminary hearing and the likelihood of gaining it against
the cost of such a step.
The instant case presents a situation in which it can be seen that
the quality of due process will be little advanced by sustaining the
rulings of the courts below.
52
The Supreme Court was, of course, presented with opinions and
argument on factors other than the pragmatic element, as summa-
rized above. The procedural problems, the implications of prior de-
cisions of the Supreme Court and conflicting views of the require-
ments of the fourth amendment and the due process and equal
protection clauses attracted the primary attention of the lower
courts, the litigants and the amici. Yet, a review of the opinion of
the Court reveals that it was the practical principal, i.e., concern
dant appears unconvictable. [Tihere still remains the possibility of wrongly moti-
vated prosecutorial acts wherein the defendants are charged when there is little
basis for invoking the criminal process. Is there, in these comparatively few situa-
tions, a justification for imposing a constitutional requirement for a preliminary
hearing in all cases, felony and misdemeanor, where confinement may result?....
When held, the hearing often fails to serve as an effective evidentiary screen to
weed out unfounded charges. There are many reasons for this. First of all, a large
portion of magistrates and justices of the peace who are supposed to make an
informed "judicial" determination of probable cause have had little or no formal
legal training. Secondly, these judicial officers often have a heavy work load be-
cause they usually have jurisdiction to try most misdemeanors and all petty offense
cases in addition to their power to process the preliminary stages of felony cases.
The large volume of cases of all types processed by each magistrate, particularly
in urban areas, is reflected in delay and inability to give more than cursory consid-
eration to individual cases .... [F]or the court to constitutionally require the
adaptation of the lower court's plan by state courts would unnecessarily interfere
with the state's criminal jurisdiction, would further institutionalize the process
with little real value, and add significant real physical burdens on court mecha-
nisms that may detract from, rather than enhance, the quality of justice.
Brief for the State of Washington as Amicus Curiae at 12-26, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975) (citations omitted).
52. Brief for the State of Washington as Amicus Curiae at 25-26, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975) (citations omitted).
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for the impact of the decision on the criminal justice system, which
probably shaped the resolution of the issue.
THE DECISION
Initially, the Supreme Court deftly eliminated any procedural
barriers to a discussion of the merits and affirmed the district
court's holding that plaintiffs claim for relief was not barred by "the
equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions,
. . . Similarly, the Court brushed aside concern for the particular
mode of federal relief sought, noting that "[b]ecause relief was
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy." 4 Further,
the Court engaged in mental gymnastics in order to cope with the
shifting procedural basis of the decision below. While the original
order did not enjoin a state statute or legislative rule of statewide
application, the constitutionality of a state "statute" was drawn
into question for the first time when the criminal rules were
amended and considered on remand. The Court observed:
The District Court supplemental opinion can fairly be read as a
declaratory judgment that the amended rules were unconstitu-
tional; the injunctive decree was never amended to incorporate
that holding and the opinion of the Court of Appeals is not incon-
sistent with the conclusion that the District Court did not enjoin
enforcement of the statewide rule.55
Thus, a district court of three judges was not required.
Finally, the Court avoided the last hurdle of mootness (since the
named respondents had been convicted) when it observed that
"[tihe attorney representing the named respondents is a public
defender, and we can safely assume that he has other clients with a
continuing live interest in the case.""
Determining the merits of the case, the Court found that an arres-
tee has a right to a probable cause determination prior to continued
detention, 7 and that the fourth amendment requires that this deter-
mination be made by a judicial officer.5 8 Moreover, the Court re-
lieved governmental concern over the impact on the criminal justice
system that an affirmation of the district court's order would cause.
53. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975).
54. Id. at 107.
55. Id. at 109-10 n.10.
56. Id. at 111 n.11.
57. Id. at 111.
58. Id. at 117.
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This relief was provided when the court found that the judicial
determination of probable cause can be had "without an adversary
hearing."s"
The nonadversary probable cause determination required by the
Court approached an ex parte determination by a magistrate issuing
a search warrant or a warrant of arrest. The Court indicated that
the determination may be based on hearsay and written testimony,
and that counsel, confrontation or cross-examination were not re-
quired. Implicitly the Court also found that compulsory process and
an opportunity to present a defense were not included in the pro-
ceeding. Finally, the Court indicated that the probability that de-
fendant had committed the offense for which he was detained was
all that was to be found at this nonadversary hearing. 0
The Court's resolution that fourth amendment requirements
could be met in a nonadversary hearing appears to have been moti-
vated in part by a concern for the impact upon the caseload burden
of the criminal justice system that a full adversary hearing might
have been imposed:
Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases
and the complexities of our system. The processing of
misdemeanors in particular, and the early stages of prosecution
generally are marked by delays that can seriously affect the quality
of justice. A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings
for all persons detained pending trial could exacerbate the problem
of pretrial delay. 61
Certainly by declining to require another full procedural hearing,
the Supreme Court reduced the impact that each individual case
would impose on the criminal justice system. The impact of a few
additional papers to be filed to show probable cause to detain and
the time that a magistrate, already concerned with the case, must
take to read those documents is less than that which might have
been required.
Likewise, an immense investment of manpower and facilities was
avoided by the Court's designation that the determination be non-
adversary and observation that "the nature of the probable cause
determination usually will be shaped to accord with a State's
pretrial procedure viewed as a whole." 2 In summary, the existing
procedures of some states may satisfy the requirements of the fourth
59. Id. at 120.
60. Id. at 125.
61. Id. at 122 n.23.
62. Id. at 123.
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amendment. Others may require only minor adjustment, such as
acceleration of existing preliminary hearings."
The Court, by precise definition of the issue, was careful not to
effect any shift in the functions performed by various units within
the criminal justice system. In its original opinion, the district court
had articulated the issue as whether the arrestees have a right "to
a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer to determine whether
there is probable cause that they committed the offense with which
they are charged." 4 The court ruled that "under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, arrested persons, whether or not released
on bond, have the constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the
question of probable cause."" The district court's loose definition
and resolution of the issue confused the propriety of the detention
with the propriety of the prosecution. The district court would have
had the magistrate validate not only the police officers' arrest, but
the prosecutor's decision to charge. The preliminary hearing de-
signed by the district court would have committed "defendant to
answer to the court having trial jurisdiction; otherwise the magis-
trate shall discharge the defendant.""6 In its third opinion, the dis-
trict court compounded this confusion by declaring that the issue
involved whether the plaintiffs ought to receive "an impartial judi-
cial determination of probable cause for their detention," yet ad-
dressing itself to sanctions for the "denial of, or overruling of, a
preliminary hearing."67 The court of appeals narrowed the issue to
whether the fourth and fourteenth amendments required "an expe-
ditious hearing before a judicial officer on the question of probable
cause for arrest."68 Finally, the Supreme Court stated the issue pre-
cisely: "whether a person arrested and held for trial under a prose-
cutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determi-
nation of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty." 6 The
Court thus removed from contention the sufficiency of evidence
required to file an information and the existence of probable cause
to hold an arrestee to answer for trial. Thus, from its very statement
of the issues the Supreme Court clearly indicated that it did not
intend to challenge the function of the state's attorney in bringing
the charge.
63. Id. at 124.
64. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F.Supp. 1107, 1109 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
65. Id. at 1115.
66. Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F.Supp. 490, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
67. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286, 1287, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
68. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 105 (1975).
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The Supreme Court specifically did not "imply that the accused
is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prose-
cute."70 Indeed, the Court opined that the prosecutor's "conscien-
tious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affords a mea-
sure of protection against unfounded detention."'" This safeguard
distinguishes criminal prosecutions from parole revocations by
correctional authorities." Manifestly, the increased professional-
ization of prosecutors throughout the nation justifies these observa-
tions by the Supreme Court.7" Additionally, the Court's requirement
that the determination be timely, rather than immediately after
arrest, tends to permit the prosecutor time to make a reasoned and
deliberate decision on the propriety of charging those whom the
police have arrested.
Finally, the Court cautiously fashioned its order to avoid altera-
tion of the fundamental nature of criminal law practice. In provid-
ing for a post-arrest nonadversary hearing which was a mirror image
of the pre-arrest determination for issuance of a search warrant or
warrant for arrest, the Court took care not to reflect on the propriety
of established pre-arrest procedures. The Court observed that a per-
son arrested under warrant would have received a prior judicial
determination of probable cause. Under Florida law, a warrant may
be issued upon a sworn complaint that states facts showing that the
suspect has committed a crime. The magistrate may also take testi-
mony under oath to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to
believe the complaint is true.74 Similarly, the Court also refrained
from disturbing the practice of charging criminals by grand jury
indictment.75 By fashioning post-arrest procedures which parallel
procedures preceding arrest, impact to well-established criminal
law procedures was diminished.
The degree to which the Court was successful in affording the
incarcerated defendant judicial review of his continued detention
without affecting a major impact on the states' criminal justice
70. Id. at 119.
71. Id. at 117.
72. Id. at 121-22 n.22.
73. See, e.g., NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, THE PROSECUTOR'S SCREENING
FUNCTION, CASE EVALUATION AND CONTROL.
74. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116-17 n.18 (1975).
75. The willingness to let a grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and
detached magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the courts
and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust prosecutions (citations
omitted).
Id. at 117 n.19.
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systems can be measured by reviewing the response of the states to
Gerstein. The Supreme Courts of Florida and California have each
addressed themselves to adopting their particular system to the
requirements of Gerstein. In those responses may be found practical
guidelines for other jurisdictions as they cope with the new fourth
amendment mandates.
RESPONSE OF THE STATES
Florida
The Florida Supreme Court responded immediately by promul-
gating a new rule regarding preliminary hearings,76 providing that
upon arrest, if a defendant either remains in custody," or shows that
his conditions of release are a significant restraint on his freedom,7"
there "shall" be a nonadversary probable cause determination by a
magistrate.79 However, persons arrested on warrants or individuals
who are out of custody and cannot show a significant restraint are
not entitled to a nonadversary probable cause determination.
The magistrate will hear the probable cause determination within
three days of defendant's arrest. That hearing shall occur either at
defendant's first appearance (within 24 hours of his arrest) or should
the proof be unavailable, within 72 hours of the defendant's arrest.
If the probable cause determination is made at the first appearance,
it is specifically designated as nonadversaryw
In either case, at the first appearance or at the ex parte determi-
nation within 72 hours of arrest, the hearing is to be based upon
either a sworn complaint, affidavit, deposition under oath, or re-
corded testimony under oath."'
The probable cause determination must be made in writing and
filed along with the evidence considered. If probable cause is found,
defendant is held to answer to the charges. If no probable cause is
found, or if the nonadversary probable cause determination is not
76. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 309 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1975).
77. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131a(l) (1975).
78. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131 a(2) (1975).
79. FLA. R. CRaI. P. 3.120, 3.131a(1) (1975).
80. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131a(1) (1975). At the first appearance, an accused is informed of
the charge and given a copy of the complaint. The complaint is typically the initiating
document. Prosecution is typically had on indictment or information. An indictment may be
prosecuted on for any offense, but must be used for an offense involving the death penalty.
An information may be used for prosecuting any offenses except those carrying the death
penalty. However, county court prosecutions may be on informations, indictments or com-
plaints. If the proof is not available, then a probable cause determination is made ex parte.
Id.; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131a(3), 3.140(a), 3.140(g) (1975).
81. FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.131a(1), (3) (1975).
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made within appropriate time limitations, defendant is released
outright. However, if an indictment or information is filed, defen-
dant is released on the condition that he appear on such indictment
or information.82 Note that contrary to the Supreme Court's opinion
that an indictment conclusively determines the existence of proba-
ble cause, the defendant under the new rule is entitled to such a
determination, even if the grand jury has acted.
If neither an information nor indictment is filed within 21 days
after arrest, defendant becomes entitled to an adversary prelimi-
nary hearing on the felony charges,8 in which compulsory process,
confrontation, cross-examination, opportunity to present a defense,
transcripts, and written findings are made available to the ac-
cused. 4 If probable cause is found at the adversary preliminary
hearing, the accused is held to answer to the circuit court which has
jurisdiction to try felony cases.8 1 If, however, no probable cause is
found at the adversary preliminary hearing, defendant is released,
unless an indictment or information is filed, in which case defen-
dant is released on the condition that he appear on those accusatory
pleadings. The finding of no probable cause does not bar the bring-
ing of indictment or an information.
The new Florida preliminary hearing rule does not appear to sub-
stantially threaten an increase in caseload or require an adjustment
of added manpower or facilities because, in effect, it utilizes existing
magistrates and court time already committed to defendant's case,
either at the first appearance or subsequently. Further, the nature
of the nonadversary hearing prescribed does not admit of an expan-
sion of the time to be devoted to cases. Of course, as the finding of
the magistrate does not bar further prosecution, the function of the
prosecutor is not threatened. Although the Florida Supreme Court
elected to extend the right to a probable cause determination to
those who are indicted, the charging decision of the grand jury is not
interfered with because no sanction follows, except discharge. Ac-
cordingly, the previous practice appears to be maintained, in that
direct informations continue to be permitted.
82. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131a(4) (1975).
83. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131b(1) (1975). An information or indictment is required to prose-
cute a felony. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140a, 3.140g (1975). Presumably, a misdemeanor may be
tried without an indictment or information, i.e., on a complaint. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 34.13
(1975).
84. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131b(2), (3), (4), (5) (1975).
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 26.012 (1975).
86. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131b(5) (1975).
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California
In California every felony prosecution not initiated by grand jury
indictment is brought upon an information filed after a magistrate
determines probable cause in an adversary preliminary hearing. 7 In
addition, an accused felon may seek review of the grand jury's deter-
mination or the magistrate's finding by moving to set aside the
indictment or information on the grounds that he had been indicted
or committed without probable cause.
8 1
California's response to Gerstein 9 began on February 19, 1975.
Leonard Walters, who had been arrested without a warrant on mis-
demeanor charges, was arraigned on a complaint reciting the
charges in the language of the relevant code section. Walters
pleaded not guilty, a trial date was set and bail fixed at $500. Wal-
ters then requested a preliminary hearing to determine the existence
of probable cause for his detention, relying on Gerstein v. Pugh,
87. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 17(a), 738-39, 858-83, 949 (1975).
88. CAL. PEN. CODE § 995 (1975).
89. Law enforcement in California made immediate efforts to comply with Gerstein. In
February of 1975, the Alameda County District Attorney's Office advised
California must now adapt its procedures to comply with the mandates handed
down in Gerstein. Where an arrest in this State is made by warrant, the Gerstein
decision does not require an adjustment ...
Arrests made without warrant, however, present a different picture. In such
situations, the suspected offender is arrested on the basis of an officer's or a citizen's
determination that probable cause exists to believe the person in question has
committed a crime. The arrest usually is made on the scene, and the District
Attorney files a complaint alleging the appropriate violation. In each instance-
peace officer, citizen, prosecutor-the "probable cause" determination has been
made by an individual who is a "non-judicial" entity. Gerstein requires that such
determination be made by a judicial officer in order to justify the suspect's reten-
tion in custody. Additionally, this judicial hearing must be conducted "promptly"
after the suspect's incarceration.
It is believed that in misdemeanor cases the procedures presently used in warrant
situations should be extended to filing of all misdemeanor complaints. That is, all
misdemeanor complaints should be accompanied by a declaration under oath
which sets forth the required "probable cause". In warrant situations, the magis-
trate's issuance of an arrest warrant would constitute his finding that the probable
cause standard has been met. In non-warrant situations, the magistrate could ex-
amine the declaration attached to the misdemeanor complaint and note for the
record his determination the "probable cause" has been demonstrated ....
In Alameda County it has been decided that dependence upon the felony prelimi-
nary hearing as the method to comply with the Gerstein decision is hazardous.
Therefore, a procedure will be adopted wherein a "probable cause" declaration will
be filed as part of all felony complaints. Therefore, the procedures in this county
will be the same for felonies as well as misdemeanors. A declaration will be filed as
part of the complaint procedure in all cases (felony or misdemeanor). The court
then will be requested to make a "prompt" ruling upon the sufficiency of such
showing.
VI POINT OF VIEW 20-21 (1975).
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decided by the United States Supreme Court the previous day. On
the basis of the police report of Walters' arrest, the court found
probable cause."
In a proceeding upon Walters' petition for a writ of habeas corpus
the California Supreme Court concluded that "the probable cause
determination made at [Walters] arraignment complied with [the
California Supreme Court's] interpretation of Gerstein's procedural
requirements."'" Prior to so concluding the court reviewed existing
California procedure, analyzed Gerstein, and rendered a decision
which would, in the court's words "act as a declaration of rights of
all persons detained for the alleged commission of a misdemeanor
as well as others detained for infractions or violations as of the date
this opinion becomes final." 9
California procedures governing pre-trial detention of accused
misdemeanants was readily found to be deficient, as an accused is
not afforded a post-arrest judicial determination that probable
cause exists for his continued detention. Thereupon, the court de-
tailed who would be entitled to such a determination, as well as
when and how such a determination would be made.
Any person who had been arrested with or without a warrant and
held for trial on a misdemeanor or infraction or lesser offense and
who was not released on bail or on his own recognizance would be
entitled to a probable cause determination." The court extended
Gerstein to include arrests with a warrant, noting:
It thus appears that when a magistrate has determined the exist-
ence of probable cause for arrests, even in an informal ex-parte
proceeding before arrest, Gerstein has been satisfied.
A difficulty is immediately apparent, however, in that after his
arrest a defendant is not afforded an opportunity to challenge in
the criminal proceedings the propriety of the determination of
probable cause for issuance of the warrant. If we do not afford him
the opportunity to make that challenge, then we would, in actual-
ity, give conclusive effect to the propriety of all arrest warrants
merely because the warrant issued. We elect not to approve of
procedure for determining the compliance with a constitutional
mandate when that procedure is vulnerable to attack on grounds
which suggest the possibility of a type of star-chamber determina-
tion, particularly when the alternative poses little additional bur-
den on the administration of justice."
90. In re Walters, 15 Cal. 3d 738, 743, 543 P.2d 607, 611 (1975).
91. Id. at 753, 543 P.2d at 619.
92. Id. at 744-45 n.4, 543 P.2d at 612 n.4.
93. Id. at 742-43, nn.1 and 2, 543 P.2d at 611 nn.1 and 2.
94. Id. at 749, 543 P.2d at 615-16.
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Additionally, notwithstanding the existing remedy of collateral at-
tack by habeas corpus, the court determined it proper to provide a
hearing even in instances when a misdemeanant is arrested on a
warrant. 5
As to accused felons the Court observed
that our procedures which provide for a preliminary hearing in the
case of a felony charged by information fully comply with Gerstein
requirements. In case of a demand for a Gerstein hearing at the
time of arraignment on an information the [Superior] court need
only to ascertain the fact that the accused was held to answer
following a preliminary hearing [in the inferior court] and thereu-
pon conclude that probable cause for detention exists."
The court further noted that, since a person accused by indictment
or information of a felony may challenge the existence of probable
cause by a motion to set aside the indictment or information on the
ground that it had issued without probable cause, a hearing thereon
would provide timely judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause to detain pending trial.
However, this probable cause determination was not to be auto-
matic; rather, it is incumbent upon defendant to move the court to
make or to continue the determination. His failure to do so at the
time of arraignment, with notice of his right thereto, waives that
right. The arrestee should so move after bail is fixed (where, pre-
sumably, he is not released on his own recognizance) and prior to
his being put to the election of posting bail. 7
At the probable cause hearing the prosecution need only to estab-
lish a prima facie case sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believ-
ing that the suspect had committed or was committing the offense
charged. When arrest is effected by warrant
the probable cause finding may be made solely upon an examina-
tion of the complaint, arrest warrant and supporting affidavit.
From the face of these documents, the court may make a determi-
nation that the warrant was issued by a magistrate upon an affida-
95. Id. at 749 n.5, 543 P.2d at 616 n.5. Thus, the court observed that an accused misde-
meanant held for trial in an inferior court had the right to seek a Gerstein-type determination
in the superior court on habeas corpus. Rather than cause a surge of litigation in the superior
courts of the state, and the court shifted the accused misdemeanants remedy to the inferior
court where the principal matter was already pending.
96. Id. at 752 n.8, 543 P.2d at 617-18 n.8.
97. The most appropriate time for a judicial determination of probable cause would be
at the time of arraignment or bail setting unless the parties stipulate to a later date or
defendant requests a continuance. Id. at 750, 543 P.2d at 616.
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vit or complaint stating specific factual circumstances justifying a
determination of probable cause for arrest."
If the arrest is effected without a warrant, or by a warrant where
the supporting documents do not on their face properly establish
probable cause for pre-trial detention, the court may make its find-
ing upon a sworn complaint which incorporates by reference other
factual material, such as a copy of the police report or other report
which may contain hearsay. However, such reports and materials
submitted must be stated upon personal knowledge of the reporting
party or upon information and belief where the source of the infor-
mation is demonstrated to be trustworthy.
If relevant documentation does not support probable cause for
continued detention, the court may receive testimonial evidence
on the issue in the presence of the defendant and his attorney. But
the receipt of such testimony is merely a substitute for factual
materials which could have been presented by sworn statement
and, as the defendant is not entitled to challenge such factual
statements by confronting and cross-examining the declarer, he
likewise has no right to confron and cross-examine the witness who
testifies on the issue of probable cause to detain."
Contrary to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation in
Gerstein of the United States Constitution, the California Supreme
Court held that a defendant was entitled to counsel as a matter of
right under the California Constitution.
Finally, the court described the consequences of such a hearing.
Of course, if probable cause to detain is found, the accused must be
put to his election of posting bail or remaining in custody.
If the judicial officer finds that probable cause has not been estab-
lished, the defendant must be discharged from custody. However,
the prosecution of the offense is not precluded thereafter since
additional evidence may be obtained by time of trial. In any event,
an unlawful arrest is not a bar to trial. Gerstein is concerned only
with the probable cause for pretrial detention and does not purport
to hold that the absence of probable cause for detention bars fur-
ther prosecution of the case.'"
The California Supreme Court recognized and echoed the concern
of the United States Supreme Court for the impact of its decision
on the criminal justice system, stating:
98. Id. at 751, 543 P.2d at 616.
99. Id. at 753, 543 P.2d at 618.
100. Id.
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We emphasize that procedures approved by this opinion should
not be read as exclusive of others which may be employed by
magistrates and trial courts in making probable cause determina-
tion in compliance with Gerstein. Judicial administration prob-
lems in the crowded courts of our urban centers are different from
those in the rural counties and may necessitate and justify differ-
ing procedures."'
Initially it should be observed the California Supreme Court, by
preserving existing felony proceedings, took care not to upset the
practice of criminal law. Likewise, by indicating that a prosecution
may be continued in spite of a finding of no probable cause, the
court designed no implicit threat on the charging function of the
prosecution. The court made a notable contribution to the principal
of relieving system impact when it specified that police reports are
an acceptable documentation of probable cause, thereby diminish-
ing any potential increase in secretarial staff and facilities. Typi-
cally, law enforcement in the detection of crime and arrest of sus-
pects generates numerous official documents, e.g., arrest reports,
crime reports, supplemental reports, statements of witnesses, dia-
grams, inventories of evidence seized, investigation summaries and
other "police reports." In utilizing these already existent documents
the court avoided the necessity of expanding existing manpower and
physical plant investments to produce more paper. Finally, in three
points, the court sought to avoid substantial increases or shifts in
the caseload borne by the trial courts of the state. Since a misde-
meanant confined on a warrant could seek a probable cause deter-
mination in the superior court by a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, the supreme court shifted this caseload to the inferior court
where the caseload, by virtue of the misdemeanor complaint, al-
ready existed. This concern for caseload impact thus accounts for
the court's apparent expansion of a Gerstein probable cause hearing
to include cases of arrest on warrants. California Penal Code section
1204.5, in effect, prohibited a judge who had read any police reports
or other information regarding the offense from presiding over the
proceedings. The court avoided the possibility that this section
might disqualify a judge from presiding at both a Gerstein probable
cause hearing and the trial by fitting a probable cause determina-
tion within one of the exceptions of that Penal Code section. °2 Fi-
nally, the court avoided a potentially serious movement which may
have expanded the existing caseload in inferior courts when it ad-
101. Id. at 753, 543 P.2d at 619.
102. Id. at 752 n.7, 543 P.2d at 617 n.7.
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mitted a state constitutional right to counsel, but denied the right
to challenge, cross-examine or confront the witnesses or materials
presented at a probable cause determination.
Illinois
In Illinois, "no person shall be held to answer for a crime punisha-
ble by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless either
the initial charge has been brought by indictment of a grand jury
or the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to estab-
lish probable cause."'0 3 A person who is arrested with or without a
warrant is entitled to a preliminary hearing on the complaint or
information if the charge is a felony. However, the individual is not
entitled to a preliminary hearing if the charge is for a misde-
meanor. 04 Nor is a defendant entitled to a preliminary examination
if he is indicted before such examination occurs.' 5 Of course, a
defendant may waive indictment to be prosecuted on the informa-
tion or complaint.' 6
The purpose of such a preliminary hearing is to determine proba-
ble cause to hold defendant to answer; that is, to insure that a
defendant is not unduly detained pending trial. 107 The nature of a
preliminary hearing is adversary, however, a limited amount of
hearsay is admissible. 108 A magistrate's suppression of evidence is
not binding on the prosecution in a subsequent trial. 09 Nor does a
discharge of the defendant at a preliminary hearing bar a subse-
quent indictment." 0 Thus, there appears to be no sanction for a
denial of a preliminary hearing.10
If probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the
103. ILL. CONST. art I, § 7.
104. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 109-1(a), I12-2(a) (1975). See Note, Criminal Justice In
Extremis, 36 U. CH. L. REV. 455, 497, 570 (1969). See also People v. Miner, 85 Ill. App.2d
360, 229 N.E.2d 4 (1967).
105. ILL. CONST. art. VII. See also People v. Kent, 54 Ill. 2d 161, 295 N.E.2d 70 (1973);
People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill. 2d 165, 295 N.E.2d 724 (1973); People v. Brown, 11 111. App. 3d 67,
296 N.E.2d 77 (1973); People v. Spera, 10 111. App. 3d 305, 293 N.E.2d 656 (1973).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2 (1975).
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(a) (1975). See People v. Moore, 27 Il. App. 3d 1078,
327 N.E.2d 84 (1975).
108. People v. Goines, 20 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 314 N.E.2d 193 (1974); O'Shea, The Prelimi-
nary Hearing In Illinois-Nature And Practice, 57 ILL. B.J. 556 (1969).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(e). See People v. Kent, 54 Ill.2d 161, 295 N.E.2d 710
(1973); People v. Spera, 10 111. App.3d 305, 293 N.E.2d 656 (1973).
110. People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 324 N.E.2d 403 (1975); People v. Hood, 59 Ill.2d 315,
319 N.E.2d 802 (1974).
111. Robinson, The Right To A Preliminary Hearing Under The 1970 Constitution, 64 LL.
B.J. 160 (1975).
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charged crime appears, he is held to answer for a grand jury indict-
ment unless he waives such a proceeding. If probable cause is not
found, the accused is discharged; however, he may still be in-
dicted."'
Thus it appears that the Illinois procedure suffers from the same
deficiency as did California's. Like California, Illinois does not re-
quire a preliminary hearing where the defendant is charged with a
misdemeanor. In People v. Miner, Justice Stouder observed in dis-
sent:
The majority opinion also indicates that the consequences of less
serious offenses as contrasted with more serious offenses are such
that a distinction based thereon, relative to a right of a preliminary
hearing, is appropriate. In the first place the distinction created is
not based on the seriousness of the offense charged and in the
second place where the penalty may be incarceration the duration
or place of confinement would appear to have little relationship to
the principle that a person should not be required to answer or
defend himself against baseless or unsubstantiated criminal
charges."'
Insofar as the United States Supreme Court requires a probable
cause determination for all persons in custody, it appears that the
Illinois practice of denying a misdemeanant a preliminary hearing
may be, in part, unconstitutional. Illinois certainly need not provide
misdemeanants with full probable cause adversary hearings; how-
ever, Illinois, in the wake of Gerstein, may be required to provide
accused misdemeanants who are held pending trial with, at the very
least, a nonadversary probable cause determination. Such a deter-
mination may be modeled on that presently required in Florida or
California.
The class of accuseds to whom a probable cause determination is
afforded differs slightly between Florida and California. Florida
gives such a determination to those arrested without a warrant or
those who can show that the conditions of their release constitute
significant restraint on their liberty. California does not provide for
the latter class but does include those who are arrested on a warrant.
The California model is not recommended in this aspect, because
it is the product of that state's particular system, in that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court expressly desires not to initiate a flood of peti-
tions for writs of habeas corpus to the superior court."' On the other
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 109-3(a), 111-2(d) (1975).
113. 85 Ill. App. 2d at 370, 229 N.E.2d at 9-10.
114. In re Waiters, 15 Cal. 3d 738, 543 P.2d 607 (1975).
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hand, the Florida model appears to more closely approximate the
spirit of Gerstein.
Florida and California also differ regarding when a probable cause
determination is to be made. In Florida, the determination occurs
either at the first appearance, or if the proof is not then available,
within three days of the arrest; in California, it may occur either
upon arraignment or at the bail setting hearing, but prior to defen-
dant's election to post bond. The determination is automatic in
Florida, whereas it occurs only on request, after notice, in Califor-
nia. Certainly Illinois, with the diversity prevalent between urban
and downstate courts requires flexibility in settling a time for the
probable cause determination. Accordingly, the rigid Florida rule
requiring automatic determinations should be rejected and the Cali-
fornia provision for determination upon request, after notice of the
right thereto, adopted. Perhaps the middle ground, providing for a
probable cause determination unless waived may be appropriate in
that it parallels the felony procedure providing for a grand jury
indictment unless waived. In any event, the Florida proviso that the
determination be made within a certain period when the proofs
become available is flexible, and therefor recommended.
Florida and California do not coincide in the question of what
other parties may be present when the magistrate makes his deter-
mination. Florida specifically permits the magistrate to make the
probable cause determination outside defendant's presence. In con-
trast to such an ex parte proceeding, California suggests that defen-
dant and his attorney be present. Illinois might follow the example
of the United States Supreme Court in Gerstein and provide for that
approach which manifests the least impact on the local criminal
justice system. In that case, an ex parte proceeding is clearly the
more appealing method due to its flexibility: an ex parte proceeding
may be conducted in chambers without the investment of facility
and personnel that court sessions entail.
The nature of the evidence upon which the determination is made
is fundamentally the same in Florida and California. Both states
require that the evidence be under oath and, apparently, to provide
for review, a record must be made. In one aspect, the California
model is exemplary. California accepts arrest and follow-up reports
written and signed by the arresting officer, under penalty of perjury,
stated upon the personal knowledge of the officer or upon his infor-
mation and belief where recited facts demonstrate the trustworthi-
ness of such information. Such reports are typically prepared by the
police as a matter of standard operating procedure. Utilization of
these existing documents is recommended as imposing the least
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additional burden on the criminal justice system.
Finally, Illinois might provide that discharge upon a finding of no
probable cause to detain will not bar subsequent prosecution. Ac-
cordingly, the Florida model should serve as a pattern insofar as it
provides that upon release in cases where an accusatory pleading is
filed in the trial court, discharge is subject to the condition that
defendant appear at all court proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Clearly system impact, in terms of projection regarding the poten-
tial effect of the lower courts' decisions on the various state criminal
justice systems, influenced the Supreme Court in Gerstein. That the
Court refused to mandate an adversary preliminary hearing in all
criminal prosecutions argues that the influence was considerable.
Rather, the Court fashioned relief in the form of a nonadversary
probable cause determination which is sufficiently flexible to ac-
commodate the interest of the detained accused without causing
serious displacements within the diverse criminal justice systems of
the states. California's response to the Court's mandate evidences
the flexible quality of that accommodation.
In the future, the influence which a system impact argument may
wield on the Court's disposition of an issue will vary greatly. Never-
theless, the governmental interest portion of the formula must be
fully presented to the Court to assist it in striking a proper balance.
Accordingly, when state law enforcement agencies are invited to file
an amicus curiae brief, as in Gerstein, they must accept. State
officials must not hesitate to present to the Court a realistic view of
criminal trial practice as found in the front line trenches of their
state's prosecution efforts. Governmental interest arguments must
not dwell solely on dollar-cost analysis. Preferably, a system impact
argument should explore the effect that granting defendant's prayer
would have in such categories as the caseload burden on the compo-
nents of the system, the allocation of manpower and facilities within
the system, the functions performed by the participants of the sys-
tem, and the practice of criminal law in the system as a whole. The
argument on system impact must be presented because, as occurred
in Gerstein, the United States Supreme Court will listen.
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